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Baker: Pleading Premature Institution of Equity Suit
BENCH AND BAR
PLEADING PREMATURE INSTITUTION OF EQUITY SUIT
The method of raising the defense of the premature bringing
of a suit in equity seems to be in a confused state in West Virginia.
The question presented is whether such a defense is proper
subject matter for a plea in abatement or for a plea in bar or
must be relied upon under the general denial of an answer.
A plea in equity is in the nature of a special answer, generally raising a defense to the bill upon so~ie particular matter as
the statute of frauds, former adjudication, :stated account and the
like, but making no further answer to tlhe bill, thus saving the
embarrassment of a discovery and the labor and expense of taking
the evidence at large in the cause.' It is well settled that in determining the sufficiency of pleas in equity, equity follows the law.
The confusion as to the type of plea required to raise the defense of prematurity of suit is seen upon comparison of such
text-book statements as follows:
Kittle in his work on Assumpsit says :2
"Pleas in abatement to the action of the writ. When the
action is misconceived .... or that the action was prematurely
a plea in abatement will lie."
brought ....
On the other hand, see the same work under the heading
"Proof under the general issue plea :"'
"The defendant may also show. . . . that the suit was
commenced before the cause of action accrued."
Hogg states in his book on Pleading :'
"Plea in Abatement to an Action Prematurely Brought.
A plea that the action has been prematurely brought must
be in abatement, because such matter only goes to the plaintiff's present right of action, as when the time for bringing
suit has arrived then the action could be maintained. If such
matter be pleaded in bar the plea may be stricken out or held
bad on demurrer.
"In some cases, as where the fact that the action has been
prematurely brought on the face of the pleading, the remedy
3 See

1 HOG0'S EQUITY PLEADING (Carlin's ed. 1921)
oN AssumPsrr (1917) § 339.

§

412.

2 KEITE

3 d. § 364.
4 HOGG'S PLEADING AND Fo1s (4th ed. 1934)

§ 257.
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is by demurrer, but where extrinsic matter is relied on to
make such fact appear, it is necessary to plead the same in
abatement."
It will be noted that the only authority cited by Mr. Hogg
for this proposition is the case of Norris v. Scott.'
Mr. Carlin in the above-cited edition of HOG's EQUITY PROCEDURE makes the following statement :G
"Pleas in abatement to the bill correspond largely to
pleas in abatement to the action of the writ at common law,
such as . . . . that the action itself is prematurely brought, or
that it is misconceived."
It will be noted that the only authority cited by him for that
statement is the case of Anderson v. Piercy.7 An examination of
this case reveals the fact that it does not involve prematurity of
the bringing of the suit.
We must next consider certain West Virginia cases in which
the defense has been raised.
Flesher v. Haslers was a suit in which special commissioners
had brought an action in debt on a bond. A special plea was
filed alleging that at the time the suit was brought the commissioners had not given bond and were therefore not qualified to
maintain the action. The court held this to be a plea in abatement and not one in bar and that it should have been filed at rules,
and the plea was rejected because not so filed.
We then come to the case of Frye v. Miley," in which the
court allowed this defense to be raised on demurrer because the
facts set forth ii plaintiff's pleading were sufficient to raise it.
The next case of Boggess v. Bartlett0 was a case brought on
a mining lease in which it appeared that the suit had been brought
before the performance of certain essential conditions. And the
court in that case allowed that defense to be raised upon the heariag of the cause.
The case of Wildasin v. Long" was a case brought to set
aside fraudulent conveyaL-.es. It was at a time when the statute
did not permit the bringing of such a suit for a debt not yet due.
56 Ind. App. 18, 32 N. E. 103 (1892).
6 Carlin, op. cit. supra n. 1, at § 309.
720 W. Va. 282 (1882).
8 29 W. Va. 404, 1 S. E. 580 (1887).
954 W. Va. 324, 46 S. E. 135 (1903).
10 72 W. Va. 377, 78 S. E. 241 (1913).
1174 W. Va. 583, 82 S. E. 205 (1914).
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It appeared on the hearing, without any special plea, that the
above situation existed, that is, that the suit was prematurely
brought, and the court allowed that defense to be raised on the
hearing.
Thus the confused state of the law appears. It seems to be
a justified conclusion that in view of this situation the whole matter is one largely of discretion with the court when such a defense
is raised in an equity suit and that the court would be justified
in considering such a defense at such stage of each case as seems
to be justified by the facts of that case.
It might be asked whether or not in an equity suit the court
should permit a special plea raising such a defense to be filed
rather than requiring defendant to raise it by answer.
Keeping in mind Judge Kenna's able discussion of special
pleas in the case of Baker v. Letzkus,' 2 the statement seems to be
justified that if in an equity suit the court should determine in
the exercise of a sound discretion that the defense of prematurity
of suit can be determined as an issue separate from the main issue
involved in the suit and thereby save the parties trouble and expense, the court would be justified in permitting the filing of a
special plea in bar raising such a defense. In other words, the
statement seems justified that the whole matter is one of sound
discretion.
The practical question to be determined is whether such an
issue is to be tried by a jury under a plea, according to the provisions of the code," or by the court as under the allegations of
an answer.
-CHARLES

G. BkKER.

Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Morgantown, West Virginia.
113 W. Va. 533, particularly at 537-8, 168 S. E. 806 (1933).
13 W. VA. RBV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 55.
12
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